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Legal Considerations in Relation to
Maritime Operations against Iraq
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I

t is twenty years since I first visited the headquarters of US Naval Forces Central Command (USNAVCENT) in Bahrain. I have been there on many occasions since, whether on board visiting ships or on headquarters staffs. On my last
visit, in May 2009, to call on the UK’s Maritime Component Commander—who is
also the Deputy Commander of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) under the
operational command of the Commander, Naval Forces United States Central
Command—I was struck not only by the enormous physical development of the
US and CMF headquarters footprint in Bahrain, but by the pace and character of
the maritime security operations that stretch from the northern Arabian Gulf to
the Horn of Africa, the developed legal underpinning of those missions, and by the
unprecedented levels of genuine international cooperation, particularly between
the US-led CMF and the task groups of NATO, the European Union and the many
other nations conducting counter-piracy operations. In examining the conduct of
maritime operations by coalition forces in Iraq since 2003, and the reasons for
them, it is first necessary to consider what is a highly complex background.

* Commodore, Royal Navy. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not
represent those of the Royal Navy, the United Kingdom Ministry of Defence or Her Majesty’s
Government.

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.
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Legal Considerations in Relation to Maritime Operations against Iraq
Background
A simple list of the major maritime operations conducted in the USNAVCENT
area of responsibility during the last twenty years—from the protection of merchant shipping during the Iran-Iraq war, the first Gulf War following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the use of maritime interdiction operations to enforce UN
sanctions against Iraq, the use of maritime aviation in policing the southern Iraqi
no-fly zones, and maritime security operations in relation to international terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation after the 9/11 attacks
on the United States to the mission in Iraq since 2003—demonstrates how this area
has been at the cutting edge of maritime operations, many of which generated
novel and complex legal issues. It is striking, therefore, to observe at the outset that
notwithstanding their scale and complexity, they have not generated the development in the case of the law of armed conflict at sea that has been seen in other areas
of the law of armed conflict (LOAC) over the same period.1
There are a number of reasons for this. The simplest, of course, is that with only
two exceptions, namely the Gulf wars in 1991 and 2003, maritime operations were
not a part of an international armed conflict at sea. Whether conducted under the
explicit authority of the UN Security Council (e.g., Security Council Resolution
665,2 authorizing maritime interdiction to enforce the sanctions against Iraq established under Resolution 6613), or amid the confusion that prevailed after 9/11 concerning international terrorism or in the face of the increasing dangers of the
proliferation of WMD, the laws that regulated the conduct of maritime operations
were generally not found in the LOAC but in other areas of existing international
law and the use of force was generally consistent with domestic law enforcement.
It is also appears that much legal debate during the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath was complicated by a reticence on the parts of some States to claim
for themselves—or even to recognize in others—certain belligerent rights or use
even the language of the law of armed conflict at sea.4 When asked in 1990 whether
coalition naval forces had established a blockade, US Secretary of State James Baker
replied accurately, but in a manner that set the tone for a considerable period subsequently: “Let’s not call it a blockade. Let’s say we now have the legal basis for interdicting those kinds of shipments.”5
Against this background, the focus of debate in 1990 was thus centered on
whether boarding operations were conducted under Article 41 or 42 of the UN
Charter, the relationship between those UN Security Council authorizations and
the right of national self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter, and, of course, the
great question that became prevalent again in 2003, that of Iranian neutrality.
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Iranian Neutrality
While the mechanism in the 1990–91 Security Council resolutions restricting the
legal authorization to conduct operations against Iraq to “those states cooperating
with the Government of Kuwait” provided an effective and helpful legal limitation
on membership of the 1991 coalition, the general duty on other States to cooperate
was not so restricted and so the notion of Iranian or any other neutrality (as opposed to support) was the cause of some legal debate. If coalition forces were acting
under Article 51, the thinking went, Iranian territorial seas would be neutral waters
to be respected by all belligerents. If, however, operations were carried out under
the direct authority of Resolution 6786 and those participating were able to use all
necessary means, how could Iran, requested like all States to provide appropriate
support, claim to be neutral?
Why was this significant in 2003? Three issues stand out; each influenced consideration of maritime operations in 2003. First, one reading of the US position on
the jus ad bellum in 2003 suggested the 1991 Security Council authority had been
resuscitated7 and the 1991 debate on the impact of UN authority on neutrality
therefore revived, although many commentators have suggested that this would
only have been a real issue had there been a so-called “second resolution” in 2003
authorizing the immediate use of force to disarm Iraq. Second, certain resolutions,
not least Resolution 665, which authorized maritime interdiction operations
against all vessels entering and leaving Iraq in order to enforce the UN sanctions,
were still in place in 2003. And finally, while the coalition operations in 1991 to
remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait were most likely welcomed by Iran and were conducted without encroaching near Iranian territory or disputed maritime zones, the
same could not be said for operations after the invasion in 2003.
Although considerations of the law of neutrality and the question of Iran neutrality are important, their practical significance was initially limited. The international armed conflicts involving coalition forces in 1991 and 2003 presented, in
relation to Iraq, Iran and Kuwait, particular operational and tactical complexities
that considerably affected both the conduct of maritime operations and the application of the law that underpinned them. The foremost was geography: set at the
head of the northern Arabian Gulf, Iraq has a coastline of only thirty-five miles and
a very small territorial sea. Iraqi territorial seas are significantly bounded by those
of Kuwait and Iran, and the history of all three States during the rule of Saddam
Hussein was not only one of strikingly different positions in relation to the West,
but of sustained animosity toward each other due in no small part to historical disputes over their territories and over the maritime borders that subdivided a small
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Legal Considerations in Relation to Maritime Operations against Iraq
and heavily congested sea area through which were accessed the great waterways of
the Khor Al-Abdullah and, in particular, the Shatt Al-Arab.8
In 1991, Iran had made its intention to “refrain from engagement in the present
armed conflict” clear in statements to the United Nations,9 and subsequently
warned belligerents that their aircraft and vessels should not enter Iranian airspace
and territorial seas, and threatened to impound aircraft from either side. In the
politico-legal circumstances that preceded the 2003 invasion of Iraq, Iran did not
make formal statements at the United Nations but there is evidence that in 2003 it
was determined to be cast again as a neutral and was widely reported in the press as
expecting this to be respected. Indeed, it appears that in the early stages of offensive
operations, the Iranian government set up field hospitals near the Kurdish border
to treat victims of the war in Iraq, but then refused admission to injured fighters of
Ansar al-Islam.10 It could, of course, be speculated that this was an Iranian attempt
to be seen to be neutral in relation to Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
While coalition forces involved in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 took steps to
avoid encroaching upon Iranian territory, the nature of the invasion and occupation inevitably brought them close to Iran in a way that had not occurred in 1991.
While during offensive operations in 2003 there was no Iranian interference with
coalition forces—quite possibly due in part to the decision of coalition commanders not to conduct a full-scale amphibious assault—the disputes in relation to the
maritime border and the status of the Treaty of Algiers created ambiguity that,
along with Iran’s questionable “neutrality” from 2004, became problematic during the occupation and thereafter while coalition forces remained in Iraq under
the authority of Security Council Resolution 148311 and subsequent resolutions.
With the regime changes in Baghdad and Tehran in the intervening period, the
contradictory statements emanating from each capital and the small matter of the
1980–88 war, the status of the Treaty of Algiers12 is a matter of much debate. As a
minimum, the treaty agreed that the riverine border would follow the thalweg
(which it identified), and established a detailed process for the parties acting together to track the natural movement of the thalweg and verify the border on a
regular basis. Relations between the countries ensured that after the signing of the
treaty none of these events ever occurred and this, and the shifting river delta, was
later to create a toxic situation, notably for UK forces in command of MultiNational Division South East based in Basrah, which saw Royal Navy and Royal
Marines personnel in small boats on the Shatt Al-Arab waterway captured and
in due course held for short periods by the Iranian authorities in two separate
incidents in 2004 and 2007.13 On each occasion, UK personnel were demonstrably
on the Iraqi “side” of the waterway. In both cases, which occurred after the
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conclusion of the international armed conflict with Iraq, Iran was not entitled to
seize the UK personnel and under international law would only have had the authority to request (and if necessary require) them to leave Iranian territorial seas
immediately. An interesting legal issue, although not tested at the time, may have
been whether, either during the belligerent occupation or subsequently when
present in Iraq under explicit UN Security Council authority (and charged with
preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq), the coalition forces
may have been able to represent themselves as agents of the new Iraqi government
and rely on Article 7 of the Treaty of Algiers, which provides warships and State
vessels of Iran and Iraq access to the whole of the Shatt Al-Arab waterway and the
navigable channels to the territorial sea, irrespective of the line delimiting the territorial seas of each of the two countries.
Other Aspects of Maritime Operations from 2003
Given the profile of the tortuous process of international diplomacy, including that
at the Security Council, and the added dimension of UN weapons inspections in
Iraq, much press speculation has surrounded the political and legal controversy of
the decision to commence coalition operations against Iraq in 2003. It was clear to
those involved in military contingency planning during that period that any operation to disarm Iraq would require the removal of the regime of Saddam Hussein
and would precipitate an international armed conflict between sovereign States
that comprised conventional hostilities and belligerent occupation as regulated by
the LOAC.14
Press speculation as to possible land operations launched from Turkey (from
where the northern no-fly zone had been policed by US and UK aircraft) is well
documented. The subsequent refusal of Turkey to approve the northern option
meant that Operation Iraqi Freedom would require a massive sealift to the northern Arabian Gulf, the presence there of maritime aviation and amphibious capability and of maritime-launched missiles, and, of course, the presence of maritime
forces to counter the limited naval-mine and land-launched-missile threat and to
protect the oil terminals crucial to Iraq’s future economic viability.
Sealift
Notwithstanding prepositioning, the requirement to move naval units and massive volumes of military equipment from the United States and the United Kingdom in particular to the northern Arabian Gulf saw extensive use of the Strait of
Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Bab al-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz.
Although predominantly conducted prior to the invasion, this movement through
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international straits and the Suez Canal continued during the operation and, notwithstanding the lack of international support, no real threat was made to the transits nor were there protests against the nonsuspendable right of straits passage
applicable in peace and war.15 While it may be stretching the point to say that every
littoral State was consciously discharging its obligations as a neutral under international law, it is probably safe to assert that each acted consistently with the obligations in international law set out in the San Remo Manual.16 Indeed, the only
documented attempts to interfere with coalition shipping occurred at Marchwood
Military Port in the United Kingdom where anti-war protesters attempted to prevent Royal Fleet Auxiliary and other supply ships from sailing. The protestors were
subsequently tried and convicted of trespass and criminal damage offenses, the defense that their action was permitted under UK domestic law as necessary to avert
the crime of aggression having failed.17
Maritime Aviation
While significant air assets were based on land in the Gulf region, the presence of
US and UK aircraft carriers, operating both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters,
was critical to the coalition in providing fighter and strike capability, airborne early
warning and helicopter lift for the invasion force. Although easily taken for
granted, the freedom of maneuver afforded by the 1982 UN Convention on the
Law of the Sea18 to move maritime forces to the territorial sea limits of any State
and to operate there with direct access to Iraq from the high seas and international
airspace provided a unique operating capability for maritime forces free from the
risk of outright refusal to operate from or over territories, or from restrictions and
conditions in relation to aircraft numbers and missions, by any host State.
Airstrikes by carrier-borne aircraft were integrated into the combined and joint
coalition targeting process and the air tasking order (ATO) cycle, which enabled a
coherent approach to deliberate targeting to be conducted under the direct command of the coalition targeting coordination board that sat daily (and at which the
senior US and UK legal advisers were Navy lawyers). In contrast to the first Gulf
War, where the air campaign generated much debate about the application of
Additional Protocol I, it is probably fair to say that, although it still did not apply as
a matter of law (because Iraq had not signed and the United States had not ratified), the principles codified in Article 57 in particular were followed in practice.
This was made possible by increased technology, better coalition interoperability
and the fact that, in reality, high-intensity offensive operations were conducted
only for a short period and were successful.
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Naval Fires
While much air targeting was deliberate and subject to the ATO process, even expedited processes could not keep pace with the pace of the land maneuvers, and in
the same manner close air support and artillery were provided, warships were also
used to provide crucial indirect fires. In these circumstances the role of legal advisers in theater was to ensure that those authorizing the fires (ground commanders,
forward controllers or ship’s commanding officers based on the tactical situation)
fully understood their legal obligations in relation to precautions in attack.
Maritime Offensive Operations
With the Iraqi navy largely destroyed in 1991, conventional naval operations
against belligerent naval units were largely restricted to dealing with what was a
very limited naval mining capability. Coalition forces having quickly established
sea control, the remaining threat was essentially an asymmetric one and the potential threat carried in vessels entering and, in particular, leaving Iraq.
Maritime Interdiction Operations
Although permitted under the law of armed conflict, for geographical and operational reasons there was no realistic prospect of establishing an effective blockade
of Iraq in accordance with the rules set out in the San Remo Manual.19 During the
international armed conflict in 2003, while it was determined by coalition partners
that their naval forces could as a matter of law have exercised belligerent rights of
visit and search against enemy and (in certain circumstances) neutral vessels, this
never occurred. Indeed, on this issue there was greater legal divergence in coalition
positions than in any other area, even if in practice the units themselves performed
identical missions. While the law of armed conflict at sea permits belligerent warships to board enemy merchant vessels and those neutral vessels suspected of carrying contraband to enemy territory, these powers were narrower than those
available under Resolution 665. Faced with this reality, and mindful of the requirement to prevent key personnel, weaponry and WMD or related materials from
leaving Iraq (given that the UK legal basis was Iraqi disarmament), the United
Kingdom decided to rely solely upon the UN Security Council resolutions that permitted the use of all necessary means to stop and search all inward and outward
shipping, and to seize any goods breaking the comprehensive sanctions against
Iraq. US naval forces, on the other hand, sought in addition to establish the necessary mechanisms to be able to exercise the belligerent rights of visit and search. A
contraband list was produced, US courts to conduct prize court hearings and special
commissioners were identified, and a concept of operations developed. Neither the
United Kingdom nor Australia established similar processes, both noting the
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unique circumstances of the Resolution 665 authority. Neither country issued a
disavowal of the right of visit and search.
Prisoners of War
The Third Geneva Convention states that prisoners of war (PWs) may be interned
only in premises located on land.20 While adequate provision was made for both
UK and US prisoner of war camps in Iraq with sufficient capacity for the expected
numbers, it was clear that the invasion, and in particular the helicopter assault of
the Al Faw Peninsula by 3 Commando Brigade Royal Marines, would generate
PWs and casualties in the earliest stages of the operation and before the first PW
camps were in place. In these circumstances, arrangements were made by senior
UK commanders for PWs and casualties to be transported to and temporarily held
in Royal Navy warships until PW facilities were available ashore. While not an ideal
scenario for naval commanders, and not a measure to be taken lightly in view of the
existing law, this was deemed a prudent contingency to provide a realistic and reasonably safe temporary option in view of the relatively low risk to the warships in
the northern Arabian Gulf.
Casualties
Whereas the Royal Navy during the Falklands war had participated in the establishment of a “Red Cross Box” along with Argentina and the International Committee
of the Red Cross,21 no such provisions had been adopted in 1991 when, among
other factors, there were extensive facilities available ashore. Commentators have
speculated as to why similar shore-based facilities were not available in 2003, notably in neighboring States. In their absence a similar problem to that encountered
with prisoners of war presented itself to the coalition. The Royal Navy, for its part,
while mindful that it was not protected against attack under the law, used the Royal
Fleet Auxiliary RFA Argus, an aviation training ship with troop accommodation
that had been extensively equipped as a primary casualty reception ship, for the
treatment of both coalition and Iraqi casualties alike, strictly according to their
medical need.22 Iraqi casualties were transferred to medical facilities or the United
Kingdom’s PW camp at Umm Qasr at the earliest opportunity. While Argus is
capable of being used as an “other medical ship” within the definition of Article 23
of Additional Protocol I, any protection afforded to it would have ceased in 2003
(in accordance with Art 23.3) given that its wider operational tasking brought it
within Article 34 of the Second Geneva Convention.
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Protection of Iraq’s Oil Terminals
While Iraqi oil was not a coalition war aim, it was well understood that Iraq’s future
economic viability and its ability to recover after years of neglect under the regime
of Saddam Hussein would require Iraq to gain early access to oil revenue. While
Iraqi oil facilities and pipelines ashore came under sporadic attack, the key facilities
were the Al Basrah and Khawr Al Amaya oil terminals in Iraqi territorial seas where
almost all Iraqi oil was loaded into oil tankers. Protection of those facilities was
therefore accommodated within wider operational planning (they were seized by
US and Polish forces during the opening hours of the invasion) and on completion
of the high-intensity operations became perhaps the most significant maritime
task. When on April 24, 2004 a suicide attack by a vessel-borne improvised explosive
device killed two US Navy sailors and one Coast Guardsman, the two-nautical-mile
security zone around each terminal was replaced with a three-thousand-meter
warning zone and a two-thousand-meter exclusion zone. The greatest legal significance of this step was what the zones did not do. Neither zone, even the exclusion
zone, created a trigger or “line of death.” Instead, the zones complemented a system of layered defense that permitted combat indicators of threats to be detected
and warnings given, and so inform commanders as to whether and what force was
necessary to protect the terminals and the people on them (both military and oil
workers). This took into account the density of merchant shipping in what is a confined area, the proximity of international waters and both Iranian and Kuwaiti territorial seas. It left judgment with commanders who were clear as to their mission,
who could choose not to use lethal force against fishing vessels inadvertently drifting close to the terminal, but who at the same time could be confident that if they
detected an imminent threat at a distance even beyond the outermost warning
zone, they could act decisively. In the aftermath of the April 24 attack, these proposals, made by the USNAVCENT Staff Judge Advocate, were staffed by UK legal
advisers and commanders, and received UK approval in a day.
Conclusion
The establishment in 2009 of Combined Task Force Iraqi Maritime, under alternate US and UK command, with a mission to train the Iraq navy to take responsibility for the policing of Iraqi territorial seas and protection of the oil terminals
brought within sight the end of a mission commenced in 2003, and perhaps engagement in the northern Arabian Gulf—an engagement that can be traced to the
naval patrols that began to protect shipping during the Iran-Iraq war.
While maritime forces conducting operations in the armed conflicts of 1991
and 2003 did operate within the parameters of the law of armed conflict, it is clear
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that, due to a unique combination of geographical, geopolitical, historical and
operational factors at play, elements of the law of armed conflict at sea were not utilized in full or at all. That does not mean that those parts are necessarily less relevant or that they are somehow discredited; maritime powers must be slow to see
them removed from national manuals, doctrine and training. As recent activity in
the USNAVCENT area of responsibility, and not least off the Horn of Africa, continues to demonstrate, maritime operations have a key role to play in global security, particularly where the maritime powers are called upon to deal with threats to
security caused or exacerbated by failed or failing States. Dealing with these within
the existing international law framework, and understanding the implications for
maritime operations of the growing impact of human rights legislation on operations generally, is an essential element in preserving freedom of maneuver for maritime commanders. Careful consideration of high-intensity maritime operations
and those parts of the law of armed conflict that will regulate them is a critical element in future-proofing that process. In operations in the northern Arabian Gulf
since 2003 some important modern lessons have been learned.
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